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RECENT DECISIONS
Rxon!uo
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw-FOURTEENTH AM=ENDMIENT-SPEcL*L on "BLuzn
JuRpms.-A special jury in New York County found the defendants, labor
union officers, guilty of conspiracy to extort and of extorting money by threats
of labor trouble from contractors engaged in construction of the Delaware Water
Supply System for New York City. There was challenge to the special panel from
which the jury was drawn on ground of denial of federal due process and equal
protection of law, but each juror was accepted without challenge for cause. The
defendants insist that they had a constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to have had their trial jury drawn from the
general panel. This federal question was sufficiently and timely raised but overruled
by all state courts. Held, four justices dissenting, conviction affirmed. Fay v. State
of New York, 67 Sup. Ct. 1613 (1947).'
The special jury panel has been in use in New York State since 1896, and the law2
which authorizes its use has been in effect in substantially the same form since 1901.
Since 1941, however, the use of a special jury has been confined to the counties
of Queens, Kings, Bronx, and New York.3 In essence the statute provides that
the County Clerk of each of the four counties having a population of one million
or more shall select from those qualified for the general panel a number of special
jurors who, in addition to possessing the qualifications for general jury duty, shall
have other qualifications thought to render them more impartial than the average
juror chosen from the general panel. 4 The use of special juries is now largely limited
to the trial of murder charges. 3
During the period from July 1, 1932, to June 30, 1941, every application for a
special jury was made by the People.0 Either party, however, in either a civil or
criminal action may apply for a special jury to try the issue where the due, efficient
and impartial administration of justice in the particular case would be advanced
by such trial or where the issue to be tried has been so widely commented upon that
the court is satisfied that an ordinary jury cannot without delay and difficulty
be obtained to try such issue, as may well have been true of tie present case.7
Such procedure was questioned and its constitutionality upheld in 1899, 1900,
1. People v. Fay, 296 N. Y. 510 (1946) no opinion (only five judges tool: part and all
concurred).
2. N. Y. JuDicmy LAW § 749 aa.
3. N. Y. Laws 1941, c. 402.
4. N. Y. JuDc Ry L.AvW
§ 749 aa (2) lists these other qualifications.
S. R. Porus or =H JuDicrsr- Cou;cn. EIGmTH A1J.AL RFronr 40 (1942).
6. Ibid.
7. The New York Judicial Council has attacked the procedure as being undezirable,
and unnecessary after the reform in 1940 of the jury selection process for the City of New
York. REPoRTs or =hEJuDiCIA Cou~cr. T, wNT. AU: .. %L REronT 53 (1q46). Here
the Council renews its recommendation for abolition of the special jury and lits tho:ereports in which the recommendation was made. In its Eighth Annual Report (1942) the
Council states (at page 39): "The goal of a higher calibre of jurors has now been achieved
under the new method of jury selection for the City of New York which went into effect
September 1, 1940, upon the recommendation of the Judicial Council and which now applies to all jurors those high standards which formerly were required only of spccial
jurors."
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and again in 1901.8 In 1901 a question of its conformity with the Federal Constitution under the Fourteenth Amendment, similar to that in the instant case, was
taken to the United States Supreme Court where it was upheld. 9 In the principal
case the defendants attack both the statute providing for the special jury and its
actual procedural operation as denying them due process of law and equal protection of the law of New York contrary to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Despite the precedent against defendants'
contention the Supreme Court granted certiorari' o because "A dual system of juries
presents easy possibilities of violation of the Fourteenth Amendment . . ." and because the Court wished ". . . to reconsider the question . . . in the light of more
recent trends of decision and of particular facts about the present operation of the
jury system. . ... l
The Court rather briefly considered the constitutional objections to the statute
itself and found nothing in the standards of special jury duty New York had prescribed which was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It then proceeded to a consideration of the actual administration of the
special jury act.
Defendants alleged that certain occupational groups-laborers, operatives, craftsmen, foremen, and service employees-were systematically, intentionally and deliberately excluded from the special panel, that women were excluded in the same
way, and that the special panel was organized to convict. In substantiation of the
8. People v. Hall, 169 N. Y. 184, 62 N. E. 170 (1901); People v. Meyer, 162 N. Y.
357, 56 N. E. 758 (1900); People v. Dunn, 157 N. Y. 528 (1899). In the Dunn case the
court said (at p.-535) that the ". . . end sought by the common law was to secure a panel
that would impartially hear the evidence and render a verdict thereon uninfluenced by
any extraneous considerations whatever." Anything in furtherance of that end, especially
when it had a basis in the previous history of judicial process in the state, would be considered due process. See notes 20 and 21 infra, and accompanying text. The court In the
Meyer case gave the question no consideration, treating it as having been fully answered
by the Dunn case. It received the same treatment in the HaU case where (at p. 194, 62 N. E.
at 173) the court used these words: "Is the act of the legislature embodied in chapter
378 of the Laws of 1896, providing for a special jury in criminal actions in certain cases,
a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power? . . . We answered that question In
the affirmative, and this leaves little to be now said." Other state decisions sustaining "blue
ribbon" juries are Lommen v. Minn. Gaslight Co., 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53 (1896) and
Brown v. The State, 62 N. J. L. 666, 42 AtI. 811 (1899).
9. Hall v. Johnson, 186 U. S. 480 (1902). Evidently in 1902 the courts could see little
wrong in a "blue ribbon" jury. Hall, whose conviction had been affirmed in New York,
took out a writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts based on a denial of his rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The writ was denied and the Supreme Court affirmed without
opinion the denial of the writ by the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York.
The court gave as authority three other cases where a writ of habeas corpus had been
denied: Storti v. Massachusetts, 183 U. S. 138 (1901); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S.
172 (1899) ; Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U. S. 272 (1894). In the principal case, Mr. Justice
Jackson says that it is not known to what extent these decisions were influenced by the
Supreme Court's dissatisfaction with the appellant's attempt to substitute a writ of habeas
corpus for a writ of error.
10. 329 U. S. 697 (1946).
11. 67 Sup. Ct. 1613, 1616, 1619 (1947).
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allegation of exclusion of those in certain occupations defendants offered certain
statistical data showing: first, occupations of the total population of Manhattan
(New York County); and, second, occupations of those on the special jury panel.
They offered no evidence of the composition by occupations of the general panel.
The defendants' position in this respect was essentially that they were entitled to
a jury impartially drawn from a cross section of the community and that by showing that the special panel was not a cross section of the community they had proved
their case. This position appears to have been endorsed by Justice Murphy, who
wrote the dissenting opinion in which Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge joined.

As precedent, defendants offered Glasser v. Uidtcd States,12 Tdiel v. Soutlhcrn Pacific Co.,' 3 and Ballard v. Uidted States.'4 Mr. Justice Murphy relied principally
upon Smith v. State of Texas. 5 As the majority was quick to point out, the instant
case is one in which no question of a federal jury is involved and therefore the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the Constitution do not apply.10 In fact the Con-

12. 315 U. S. 60 (1942). Glasser and others, convicted of a federal offense, claimed
that the names of the women on the petit jury list had been taken from a list of names
of members of the Illinois League of Women Voters. This allegation was not proved.
The court, however, pointed out that such a selection would not comport with the concept of the jury as a cross section of the community.
13. 323 U. S. 217 (1946). The appellant in this case claimed improper jury selection
because the clerk of the court and the jury commissioner had excluded from the jury list
all persons who worked for a daily wage. The Court said (at p. 220): "This does not
mean, of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community .... But it does
mean that prospective jurors shall he selected by court officials without systematic and
intentional exclusion of any of these groups."
14. 329 U. S. 137 (1946). In the selection of a jury list women had been excluded.
The Court considered such exclusion as a departure from the scheme of jury selection
which Congress had adopted by legislation. The Glasser, Tlhkl, and Ballard cases, in which
the majority opinion of the first two was written by Mr. Justice Murphy and that of the
third by Mr. Justice Douglas, form a trinity in which was forged the "cros- section of
the community" concept as applied to federal juries in interpretation of the provisions
of Judicial Code §§ 276, 277, 273, 21 STAT. 43 (1379), 2S U. S. C. § 412 (1940); RL',. SxAr.
§ 802 (1875), 23 U. S. C. § 413 (1940); 21 STAT. 43 (1879), 23 U. S. C. § 415 (1940).
15. 311 U. S.12S (1940). Here a Negro had been convicted upon an indictment returned by a grand jury from which Negroes had been intentionally and systematically excluded. "Nor could chance or accident have been responsible for the combination of
circumstances under which a Negro's name, when listed at all, almost invariably appeared
as number 16, and under which number 16 was never called for service unless it proved
impossible to obtain the required jurors from the first 15 names on the list. ' Id. at 131.
Congressional legislation prohibits discrimination against Negroes for service as grand or
petit jurors in any court of a state. 13 STAT. 336, 3 U. S. C. § 44 (1940).
16. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S.366, 382 (1898), where the Court said: "Prior to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment there was a similar provision against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law incorporated in the Fifth
Amendment; but as the first eight amendments to the Constitution were obligatory only
upon Congress, the decisions of this Court under this amendment have but a partial application to the Fourteenth Amendment, which operates only upon the action of the several
states." Lately the trend has been to find certain of the prohibitions in the first ten amend-
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stitution does not guarantee a trial by jury for a state offense.17 One justice has
said that there is nothing to prevent a state from adopting the civil rather than
the common law system' s and, as a partial result thereof, forcing a defendant to
testify against himself. Due process, therefore, does not import trial according to
common law principles. 19
The early view was that there was no ground of challenge to the array as long
as a sufficient number of unexceptionable persons are present.2 0 In the instant case
the Court took note of the local variations in practice stemming from diverse
sources of law and historical influences and reaffirmed its determination not to impose uniform procedures upon the several states on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 21 The Court considered the allegations as to the exclusion of women
no constitutional refrom the panel as unproved. It further stated that there was
22
quirement that a state must include women on a jury panel.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of defendants was their offer of proof
that the special jury was prone to convict. The Court considered this allegation
as unproved. Defendants had introduced statistics of convictions for both the special
and general juries showing a wide divergence in percentage of convictions 23 The
Court noted that the situation had been changed by the new method of selection
ments ". . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth
Amendment ... valid as against the states." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937).
For a list of these fundamental rights protected by the first ten amendments to the Constitution from federal abuse, and from state abuse by the Fourteenth Amendment, see
id. at 324.
17. Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314 (1892). Trial of an accused without a jury Is not
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
18. See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 31 (1879). "If the State of New York, for
example, should see fit to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New York
City and the surrounding counties, and the common law and its methods of procedure
for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so."
19. In Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 110, 111 (1908), it was said: "Due process
requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction . . . and that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given the parties....
Subject to these two fundamental conditions, which seem to be universally prescribed In all
systems of law established by civilized countries, this court has up to this time sustained
all state laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and methods
of trial, and held them to be consistent with due process of law." Essentially the same
language is used in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 340 (1915) and the Court approves
of it in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325, 326 (1937).
20. "Whilst those who are selected are unexceptionable, the fact that others equally
unexceptionable are excluded is no cause of challenge of the array." People v. Jewett, 3
Wend. 313, 321 (N. Y. 1829), quoted with approval in Rawlings v. Georgia, 201 U. S.
638, 640 (1906).
21. Certainly no one could suggest that the Constitution of the United States required
that the trial procedure to be followed in the courts in New York City with their crowded
calendars be the same as that of the courts of outlying rural sections of the country.
22. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
23.

Statistics taken from

46 (1938).

REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL FoURTH ANNUIAL

REPORT
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of the general panel in use since 1940;24 and, in addition, pointed out that even such
statistics were not conclusive as to a tendenc- to convict without other evidence
indicating a greater percentage of reversals of the verdicts of special juries, as
opposed to those of general juries.
It is submitted that the reasoning of the majority in the instant case is sound,
and based upon precedent.2 5 History has certainly sanctioned the use of special
20
and struck juries. They are not new..
Mr. Justice Murphy's argument is based in the last analysis upon what he perceives to be a discrimination in jury selection on an economic or other basis.;The "other basis" is discrimination against labor, or perhaps more particularly
against organized labor. This argument must lose its effectiveness when one considers that thirty-eight per cent of the "blue ribbon"' panel wvere clerical, sales, and
kindred workers, many of whom, in New York City, are organized. Running throughout the dissenting opinion is the concept of cross section of the community.3
This concept should be restricted to its proper field, i.e., federal juries; and the processes of state courts should be interfered with only when the appellant can clearly
show that some fundamental constitutional right has been infringed uponF3
Some of the prohibitions in the first eight amendments30 have been read into
the Fourteenth Amendment but this is only because, as the late 'Mr. Justice Cardozo
said, "... immunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of
the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to he implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become
valid as against the states." 31 As long as the states adopt or use the procedures which
are "... within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions . . ."32 the Supreme
Court should not employ the Fourteenth Amendment to read into state judicial
processes requirements which are drawn from Congressional statutes and which Congress, even if it had the power, might hesitate to impose upon the state courts.
CR
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Two brothers, Walter and Daniel, were indicted on ten substantive counts for violations of the Internal Revenue Code and on one conspiracy count. The jury found

See note 7 supra.
25. See note 9 supra.
26. The preamble to a colonial statute of 1741 in New York, 2 Col. Laws 185, indicates a desire to attain a standard for juries somewhat akin to the present "blue ribbon" or
special jury. See GozrzE AND NAT,,O.HTo. LAW EFrorcENT IN Coao: xL NEw Yon:u
467 (1944).
27. 67 Sup. Ct. 1613, 1632 (1947).
28. See note 14 supra.
24.

29.

Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 6S, 71 (187).

"The accused cannot complain if he is

tried by an impartial jury. He can demand nothing more."
30. See note 16 supra.
31.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 324 (1937).

32.

Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 316, 535 (1884).

Notice the similarity of the con-

cept employed here ". . . within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and
justice" to that employed by Cardozo, "ordered liberty."
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Walter guilty on nine of the substantive counts and on the conspiracy count. Daniel
was convicted on six of the substantive counts and on the conspiracy count. The
substantive offenses were found to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy which was held to be a continuing one. There was no evidence of affirmative
withdrawal by Daniel from the conspiracy, but it was not proven that he had participated directly in the commission of any of the substantive offenses. In fact he
had been serving a sentence for another crime during the commission of some of
the substantive crimes by Walter. The convictions were affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. Upon appeal, held, two justices dissenting, judgments affirmed.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640 (1946).
United States v. Sall,1 the holding which the majority opinion in the instant case
overrules, held that participation in a conspiracy was not in itself enough to sustain a conviction for the substantive offense even though it was committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and that, in addition to the conspiracy, evidence of
some direct participation by the defendant in the commission of the substantive
offense or other evidence from which participation therein might fairly be inferred
is necessary. The government in that case argued that proof that the accused had
entered the conspiracy amounted to proof that he had "aided and abetted" 2 the
substantive crimes. 3 This argument, rejected in that case, is apparently accepted by
the majority in the instant case, raising the question, with respect to the conviction
of Daniel on the substantive counts, whether an accomplice to a crime and a conspirator are, and are intended by Congress to be, the same thing, so that proof of
participation in a conspiracy is sufficient alone to convict any conspirator of crimes
committed in furtherance thereof by his co-conspirators.
We can best approach an analysis of this problem by considering some of the
peculiarities of the crime of conspiracy. Conspiracy was criminal at common law
long before the Statute of Edward I,4 and was made a crime in order to protect
the state not so much from incomplete offenses as from anti-social combinations
which of themselves may be more dangerous than the ends which the conspiracies
contemplate. 5 Conspiracy has always been considered a separate and distinct crime
because it involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, and is characterized
by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection which adds to the importance of pun1
ishing it when discovered.0 Conspiracy is made criminal today by federal statute,
1. 116 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). However, conviction on some, but not all,
of the counts was affirmed on evidence of sufficient participation in the substantive
offenses.
2. 35 STAT. 1152, 18 U. S. C. A. § 550 (1927). "Whoever directly commits any act
constituting an offense defined in any law of the United States, or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal." See N. Y. PENAL LAW § 2.
"A person concerned in the commission of a crime, whether he directly commits the act
constituting the offense or aids and abets in its commission, and whether present or absent and a person who directly or indirectly counsels, commands, induces, or procures
another to commit a crime, is a 'principal'."
3. 116 F. (2d) 745, 748 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
4. 33 Edward I, STAT. 2.
5. Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911 (C. C. A. Sth, 1924).
6. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 88 (1915).
7. 35 STAT. 1096, 18 U. S. C. A. § 88 (1927). "If two or more persons conspire either
to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States In any
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with the additional safeguard against unwarranted convictions, not existing at common law, that one of the conspirators must be proved to have done some overt act
to effect the object of the conspiracy. It is the nature of this overt act and its relation to the crime of conspiracy which is the cause of much of the confusion muddying the clear stream of logic throughout the conspiracy decisions. Its purpose is to
afford a locus poenitentiae, and to prove that the conspiracy has passed beyond
words and is on foot when the act is done. 8 It is the conspiracy and not the overt
act that is punished,0 or as Justice Woods stated, "This offense does not consist of
both the conspiracy and the acts done to effect the object of the conspiracy, but of
the conspiracy alone." 10 The overt act is, in a sense, something apart from the mere
conspiracy, being an act to effect the object of the conspiracy,'" even though it may
be that of any one of the conspirators, and need not be itself a crime.12 Furthermore, the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are
separate and distinct offenses punished by independent penalties,23 and the conspiracy neither violates nor arises under the statute whose violation is its objecL 14
Now, the argument is advanced in the majority opinion that if the overt act,
necessary to establish a conspiracy conviction against any conspirator, can be supplied by any conspirator, the same act is likewise attributable to the other conspirators in order to hold them responsible for the substantive offense. And this is apparently reasoned to by the application to the lay of conspiracy the principle
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of the parties do any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy, shall be fined not more
than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." See similar statute in
N. Y. Pr=.A LAw, § 4.
S. Hyde & Schneider v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 356 (1912); see United States
v. Britton, 10S U. S.199, 204 (1S3). But cf. People v. Hines, 284 N. Y. 93, 29 N. E.
(2d) 4S3 (1940), where the New York Court held that a conspiracy is not complete
until the doing of the overt act, the commission of the crime depending for its validity
upon the overt act which must be an act done to effect the object of the conspiracy.
9. Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
10. United States v. Britton, 103 U. S. 199, 204 (1S33).
11. Joplin Mercantile Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 531, 535 (1915); Hyde & Schneider v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 359 (1912); Moorehead v. United States, 270 Fed.
210, 213 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).
12. Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942); Pierce v. United States,
252 U. S.239, 244 (1920) ; United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 86 (1915); Bannon
& Mulkey v. United States, 156 U. S. 464, 468 (1S95); cf. Cramer v. United States, 325
U. S.1 (1945) where in considering a similar overt act required by statute and the U. S.
Coxsr. Art. III, § 3 to establish treason, it was held that the overt act must tend toward
the accomplishment of the criminal object and manifest a criminal intention, though such
intention may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances.
13. United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78 (1915); Clune v. United States, 159
U. S. 590 (1395); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S.540, 555 (1833). At common law consplracy
was held to merge with the successful commission of the contemplated offense limiting
punishment to the substantive crime. This doctrine no longer exists in most juridictionm.
See People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84, 94, 177 N. E. 317, 320 (1931): ". . .the crime
of conspiracy does not merge in the felonies described in the allegations of overt acts."
14. Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 53 (1942); United States v. McElvain,
272 U. S. 633, 639 (1926); United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33, 34 (1379); Sneed v.
United States, 29S Fed. 911 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
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".. . that one who counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime
is a principal."' 5 But we must remember that the substantive offense is no part
of the crime of conspiracy, and that a conspiracy itself does not violate the
statute whose violation is the object of the conspiracy. Furthermore, in applying
a principle, extracted from the definition of an accomplice, to a conspirator we are
removing the basic mark of distinction between two separately defined types of
responsibility for crime. Concededly, in practical application, it is difficult to determine precisely when a man ceases to be a conspirator and becomes an accomplice.
It is this difficulty of distinction which is the underlying cause of the inaccuracies
which appear in the decisions. Yet the difficulty in applying a distinction should be
no excuse for ignoring it. However, the ruling of the instant case appears to be the
generally accepted view 16 and there have17been hardly any attempts to restrict
it as recommended in United States v. Sail.
An impressive collection of decisions and text writers in general are relied upon
by the majority of the court in the instant case to substantiate this rule. Examination of them, however, reveals an interesting pattern of less positive authority. The
vast majority are cases which, upon examination, prove to contain evidence of
definite participation in the substantive offenses by all parties convicted of both the
conspiracy and the substantive offenses, although this fact is not often alluded to
in the opinions. The conspirators convicted in these decisions are burdened with
the accoutrements of accomplices. Without consciously acknowledging it-because
it is implicit in the decision-the courts convict of the substantive crimes those who
are manifestly accomplices.' . The furthest any of the cases go is to find one to be
a conspirator who has merely knowledge, or constructive knowledge, guilty of the
crimes of his co-conspirator, and despite many statements to the contrary, there
are no cases in which a bare conspirator, lacking even knowledge of the crimes of
his fellow schemers, is found guilty of their offenses. In this category are found most
9
of the cases cited by the majority in the instant opinion' and those cited similarly
15.

See note 2 supra.

16.

1 WHARTON, CRnnxAr. LAW 1674 (12th ed. 1932); 1 Bisnor, CRIMINAL LAW § 641

(9th ed. 1923).
17. See note 1 supra.
18.

Chambers v. United States, 237 Fed. 513, 524 (C. C. 'A. 8th, 1916) wherein there

is evidence that both conspirators had knowledge of the substantive offenses. It Is interesting to note that the opinion in this case cites Hume v. United States, 118 Fed. 689
(C. C. A. 5th, 1902) and Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906)
in both of which there was no conspiracy indictment but where the defendants, described
as conspirators, were convicted as accomplices. United States v. Bender, 60 F. (2d) 56,
57 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) in which there is evidence of knowledge and active agreement by
the defendants and where the court said: ".

.

. the jury could find from the evidence

that both appellants caused the letters to be mailed." Ader v. United States, 284 Fed. 13
(C. C. A. 7th, 1922) ; United States v. Weber, 114 Fed. 950 (W. D. Va. 1902) wherein
there was evidence of knowledge. Profitt v. ,United States, 264 Fed. 299 (C. C. A. 9th,
1920) wherein there was evidence of knowledge and acquiescence in the substantive offense.
19. Cochran v. United States, 41 F. (2d) 193, 199, 200 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) (evidence
of aiding and abetting was so substantial that the conspiracy count was dismissed and
conviction obtained against all but one as principals. When the conspiracy count was
dismissed the defendant who had not participated in the substantive offenses was granted
a new trial); Blanton v. United States, 213 Fed. 320, 325 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914) (wherein
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in the Sail case. Furthermore, those few cases in which the defendants, convicted
of the substantive crimes of fellow conspirators, could possibly be described as
bare conspirators, are found to follow the erroneous reasoning of previous decisions
where the defendants were in fact accomplices, but loosely described as "conspirators." 2 1'
Quite another line of cases cited as authorities for the general rule espoused
in the instant case are those in which conspiracy alone is charged; there being no
question of substantive offenses at issue. In these cases what is said about respon21
sibility for the substantive crimes of fellow conspirators is purely obitcr dicta. Yet
the general rule announced in the instant decision seems to have had its inception
in the statements made in such decisions, the principle having been culled from genthere was no indictment for conspiracy and defendants were convicted as accomplkes although described as conspirators in the opinion); Baker v. United States, 115 F. (2d) 533
(C. C. A. 8th, 1940) (there was no conspiracy indictment but an accomplice described as
a consiprator was convicted as a principal); Johnson v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 32
(C. C. A. 9th, 1932) (there was no conspiracy indictment but a conviction as principals
on evidence of "aiding and abetting", although defendants were described as conspirators);
Collins v. United States, 20 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. Sth, 1927) (defendant convicted as
principal on evidence of aiding and abetting) ; Boyd v. United States, 142 U. S. 450 (1892)
(the defendants are described as conspirators but were present at the scene of the crime);
United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. S96 (W. D. Ga. 1891) (two of the defendants were
found guilty of conspiracy but not of the substantive crimes and the court Eaid the substantive offense charged was that of an "accessory") ; Morris v. United States, 7 F. (2d)
785 (C. C. A. 8th. 1925) (the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy but acquitted
of the substantive offenses); United States v. Kane, 23 Fed. 743 (Colo. 1S5) wherein all
were present at the scene of the substantive crime.
20. 'Mackett v. United States, (0 F. (2d) 462 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), wherein the conspiracy and substantive counts were proved on distinctly separate evidence. This case
cites Spear v. United States, 228 Fed. 4S5, 4SS (C. C. A. Sth, 1915) wherein Hook, J.,
said: ".... the contriving of a scheme to defraud substantially as set forth must be shown
beyond a reasonable doubt, and so of the use of the mails."; Blue v. United States,
138 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943), giving as its authority Davis v. United States, 12 F.

(2d) 253 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926) in which there was no conspiracy indictment, the defendants being convicted as accomplices, but their scheme being described as a conspiracy;
Brown v. United States, 150 U. S.93 (1893); Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263
(1892); United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460 (U. S. 1827) wherein the defendants
were convicted on evidence of aiding and abetting although described as conspirators.
21. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925) (conspiracy indictment only, plus
evidence of actual participation); Northern Kentucky Tel. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. and
Tel. Co., 73 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) (conspiracy indictments only); Burns v.
United States, 279 Fed. 932 (C. C. A. Sth, 1922) (conspiracy to defraud u_ing United
States mails, only); Grayson v. United States, 272 Fed. 553 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) (indictment for conspiracy only); Jung Quey v. United States, 222 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 9th,
1915) (two counts of conspiracy and evidence of actual participation); United States v.
Olmstead, 5 F. (2d) 712 (W. D. Wash. 1925) (indictments for conspiracy only); United
States v. Bergdoll, 272 Fed. 493 (E. D. Pa. 1921) (conspiracy to evade draft laws only
charge); Arnold v. Well, 157 Fed. 429 (E. D. Wis. 1"07) (four counts of conspiracy and
evidence of "aiding and abetting"); United States v. Cassidy. 67 Fed. 693 (N. D. Calif.
1895) (indictment for two counts of conspiracy only); United States v. Sacia, 2 Fed.
754 (D. C. N. J. 1880) (conspiracy indictment only).
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eral or ambiguous phraseology or given as corollary to statements that the act of
one can be attributed to any other conspirator to constitute the overt act required
by the conspiracy statute. The rule of substantive guilt adopted by the majority in
the principal case likewise assimilates a well established rule of evidence-frequently utilized by prosecutors and undoubtedly often responsible for the insertion of a
conspiracy count in an indictment-to the effect that the extra-judicial admissions
of a conspirator, 22made during the course of the conspiracy, are evidence against all
the conspirators.
In Chew v. United States23 the court states the rule accurately and precisely to
be, ". . . if the defendants were all in the continuing conspiracy, it is immaterial
by which one of them the overt acts were committed. The overt act of one is the
act of all." There is a world of difference in meaning here from the all too frequent and misinterpreted statement, ". . . the act of each party in furthering the
common scheme is the act of all." 24 The latter is true of the overt act only, a
distinction which there is a tendency to lose sight of partly because of the frequency
with which quotations are taken out of context. Many of these erroneous interpretations have their origin in opinions where the statements made are simply promulgations of the evidentiary rules for establishing the existence of a conspiracy.
Typical of this tendency is the misuse of the words of Justice Dyer in the case of
United States v. Goldberg,25 which is cited as one of the earliest cases holding that
the act of one conspirator is the act of all.
In his dissenting opinion Justice Rutledge tells us that Congress has separately
defined three classes of crime, which are not meant to be identical and whose differences are not merely verbal. 26 They are: (1) completed substantive offenses; (2) aiding, abetting or counselling another to commit crime; and (3) conspiracy to commit
crime. The gist of conspiracy is the agreement, the overt act in furtherance thereof
being the execution or part execution of the scheme, as required by statute;27
whereas, the gist of "aiding and abetting" is in consciously advising or assisting so
as to become a party to the crime and a principal to the substantive offense. That
they are separate and distinct grounds of criminal responsibility is readily conceded
by the majority opinion in the instant case, but it can be best appreciated by considering cases such as Moorehead v. United States and Joplin Mercantile Co. v.
United States,2 in which defendants, previously acquitted of substantive crimes,
22. RicnADsoN, THE LAW OF EvinxNcE (6th ed. 1944) § 383; Moyer v. Dewey, 103
U. S. 301 (1880); Smith v. United States, 284 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) holding
that the acts and declarations of alleged co-conspirators are competent to establish a conspiracy. Contra: Cuyler v. McCartney, 40 N. Y. 221 (1869).
23. 9 F. (2d) 348, 353 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
24. Blue v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 351, 358 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) cited in the
majority opinion of the instant case.
25. 25 Fed. Cas. 1342, 1343, No. 15, 223 (E. D. Wis. 1876), "...
this act to effect
the object, though it be done by only one of the parties, binds each and all the parties
to the conspiracy and completes the offense as to all, for in that case the act of one becomes the act of both or all."
26. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U. S. 607 (1946) ; United States v. Sail, 116
F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940).
27. Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924); Hyde & Schneider v.
United States, 225 U. S. 347, 359 (1912).
28. 270 Fed. 210 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921).
29. 236 U. S.531 (1915).
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were later convicted of conspiracy to commit these same crimes and were held not
to have been subjected to double jeopardy. Or the case of Westlall v. United
States,'o wherein the defendant was first convicted of the substantive crime and,
later indicted for conspiracy to commit that crime; again, it was denied that there
was double jeopardy, the indictments being described as separate offenses arising
from the same transaction.31 The plea of double jeopardy was refused in still
another case, that of Bens v. United States32 where the defendant was indicted for
aiding the substantive crime after an acquittal of the conspiracy charge, Justice
Rogers saying, "... neither an acquittal nor a conviction of a conspiracy to commit
a crime is a bar to a prosecution for the commission of that crime or for aiding
and abetting another to commit it." But this would not be so if the evidence required to support a conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to
warrant a conviction upon the other, for this is the test of double jeopardy.P As
was said in the case of Krench v. Uidted States:34 "There was also ample proof of
the conspiracy alleged . . . but in considering all the proofs we cannot overlook
the question of double punishment."-32 And in Undted States v. Batesa ".. . . a finding of guilty as to conspiracy only involves no substantive offense. . . ." Therefore,
separate and distinct evidence over and above that necessary to convict for conspiracy must be necessary to convict for the substantive offenses involved in any
conspiracy.
The anomaly of holding on the one hand that the conspiracy and the substantive
offense it was to accomplish are separate and distinct offenses so far as double
jeopardy is concerned, yet on the other hand that the precise evidence sufficient to
convict in the case of a bare conspiracy is automatically evidence sufficient to convict on the substantive count, seemingly results, in the latter case, in a situation
where one may be convicted on a charge not proved against him or on evidence
showing that he committed another. The*result is a vicarious criminal responsibility
as broad as the civil liability of a partner for the acts of his co.partner in the course
30. 20 F. (2d) 604, 607 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) wherein the court said: ". . . it is unsound, and founded upon the false premise, that the conspiracy is a necessary incident
to and element of the substantive offense, and the same offense."
31. Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338 (1911).
32. 266 Fed. 152, 160 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920) wherein the court also said: "A conspiracy
to commit a crime is one offense, and the commission of the crime is another and a distinct offense. . . If the facts which would convict on the second prosecution would not
necessarily have convicted on the first, then the first will not be a bar to the second..."
33. Morey v. Commonwealth, log Mass. 433, 434 (1871). "A single act may be an
offense against two statutes and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not e.aempt
the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other." Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U. S. 338, 343 (1911). "The offenses charged . .. were not one and the same
.. . if the test of the identity of offenses that the same evidence is required to sustain
them be applied."
34. 42 F. (2d) 354, 356 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); accord, Kelly v. United States, 258 Fed.
392 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) (If it is necessary in proving the substantive offenses to prove
every essential element of the conspiracy, there is double jeopardy.) Note (1944) 13
FoRanA L. REV. 98 for the New York viewpoint.
35. 141 F. (2d) 436, 437 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
36. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U. S. 640, 646 (1946).
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of the business of the partnership. Analogies from commercial law and the law
of agency, such as, ". . . a conspirator constitutes his co-conspirators his agents for
,the performance of the crime," or ". . . so long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward,"3' are dangerous when
transferred to the criminal field. While such analogies may at times be proper, 88 they
contradict the basic principle that a person may be criminally liable only when he
intentionally does an unlawful act.39 The principles of agency in civil law are not
40
a part of, and have no application in criminal jurisprudence.
It is the violation of the Internal Revenue Code which is the gist of the substantive crimes charged in the principal case, not the previous agreement to do so. The
court here would ignore the difference in character between the crime of conspiracy
and the substantive crimes which may result from the conspiracy and enable the
Government, through the use of the conspiracy dragnet, to convict a conspirator of
every substantive offense committed by. any other member of the group, even
though he had no actual part in it or even knowledge of its commission. To permit
this would seem to open the way for the conviction of a conspirator more than once
for the same conspiracy, the substantive counts being merely additional conspiracy
counts each alleging another overt act. Where but one conspiracy is shown the
appellant may not be convicted twice of having joined it for that would be to place
him twice in jeopardy for the same offense. "The single agreement is the prohibited
conspiracy, and however diverse its objects it violates but a single statute. . . For
41
such a violation, only the single penalty prescribed by the statute can be imposed."
While the doctrine of criminal conspiracy has admittedly been of tremendous aid
to the enforcement of the criminal law, there is no doubt that it has at times been
abused by over-zealous prosecutors. It is submitted that in the light of the traditions of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence the doctrine should not be extended, especially
by reference to principles of vicarious responsibility appropriate to the realm of
tort liability. This is particularly true in a case, such as the principal one, where the
conspiracy was a continuing one which apparently did not have for its object the
commission of any very specific act or acts. The expression characterizing conspirators as "partners in crime" is a convenient metaphor, but like all metaphors
which are intended to liberate thought, the expression as applied by the majority
in the principal case has apparently ended by enslaving it.42

DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT TO SELL LAND-RECOVERY BY VENDEE WHEN
VENDOR DOES NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-Defendants, an individual and a corporation, contracted to sell a bar and grill and the real property upon
which they were situated to the plaintiffs. The closing of title was to be contingent
upon the issuance of a restaurant liquor license to the plaintiffs before the closing day.
37. In Coates v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 173 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932), the conspirators
were described as, ". . . partners in crime and each was the agent of the other and each
was bound by the act of the other . . ."
38. United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601 (1910).
39. Paschen v. United States, 70 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
40. SEN. REP. No. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) 20.
41. Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 54 (1942).
42. See Cardozo, J., in Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61
(1926).
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The defendants agreed to cooperate by attending all hearings called in connection with
the application and the contract provided that the deposit money would be returned
and the contracts deemed null and void in the event that the license did not issue
before the dosing day. Before the day for closing arrived, the plaintiffs learned that
consideration of the application would be delayed because the individual defendant
was charged with a violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control law, which violation allegedly occurred the same day the contract was signed. The defendants refused an adjournment of the closing day and returned the deposit money, asserting that they no longer considered the contracts in force and effect. Held, plaintiffs
are entitled to the reasonable legal and other expenses necessarily incurred in reliance on the contracts of sale. De Cesare v. Occhduto, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 675 (Sup. Ct.
1946).
The court's statement as to the measure of damages is misleading and contrary
to the ordinary rules of damages. 1
The authorities which the court cites,2 as establishing the rule of damages applicable in the instant case, are concerned with a breach by the vendor of an executory
contract to convey real property, and in this field of the law of damages, the courts
of New York are confronted with ambiguous and uncertain principles governing
the extent of the wronged vendee's recovery.3 As a general proposition, the fundamental aim of the law of damages is to compensate an injured party for the loss
suffered, whether the loss occurs by reason of a breach of contract or by tort. The
guiding principle for measuring the damages for a breach of contract is that the
plaintiff should be put in as good a position as that in which he would have been
1. 1 CLr.X, Nxw Yo=x LAw or DAma.GEs § 206 (1925).
2. The decisions in two of the cases cited would appear to support the measure of
damages enunciated by the court in the principal case: Bulkley v. Rouken Glen, Inc.,
222 App. Div. 570, 226 N. Y. Supp. 544 (2d Dep't 192S); Schorr v. Gewirz, 39 Misc.
186, 79 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1902). In the Bulkkey case, the vendor had contracted
to sell land, on which there existed a restrictive covenant as to the number of dwelling
houses which might be erected thereon, to a buyer who made known his intention to
divide the plot and erect houses the number of which violated the covenant. The court
allowed to the vendee a recovery of payments made on account, with interest, expens of
searching the main title, and, as special damages, $1,000 for "loss of the bargain," plus the
brokerage and title searching expenses on a subsale. In the Schorr case, the vendor refused to convey when the contract was assigned to an adjoining land owner, the
real party in interest. The court found that the vendor was acting in bad faith in attempting to get a higher price, and allowed the plaintiff to recover the payments on the
price, with interest, expenses of title search, and $2,500, the sum demanded in the complaint as the difference between the contract price and the market value of the land. The
decisions in these two cases, therefore, if not affected by later cases, would be good authority for the court's dictum in the instant case. The other two cases cited by the court
do not appear to substantiate the eourt's proposed measure of damages: Lichenstein v.
Davis, 237 App. Div. 894, 261 N. Y. Supp. 807 (2d Dep't 1933); Schwinner v. Roth, 111
DIisc. 654, 132 N. Y. Supp. 12 (Sup. Ct. 1920). In both these cases the failure to convey
was in good faith and the plaintiff was not allowed to recover his loss of bargain. In
such a case, as will be pointed out ifra, the plaintiff may unquestionably recover expenses of title search.
3. AMcCoasncx, DA.MAEs §§ 177-184 (rev. ed. 1935); S WniLsro.., Co.=Acis § 1399
(rev. ed. 1937) ; 1 CVtIR, Nw YORr LAw or D.SAGcEs §§ 203-210 (1924).
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had the contract been carried out,4 and that the recovery is to be limited to the
losses contemplated by the parties when the contract was made.5
Before the nineteenth century the measure of damages in contract cases rested
largely within the jury's discretion and only a comparatively few isolated rules of compensation had emerged in certain classes of contracts.6 One of the first principles set
out by the courts to control damages in breach of contract cases was that established in Flureau v. Thornhill.7 The measure of damages announced in that case is
today known as the "English rule" governing recovery in actions by the vendee on
an executory contract to convey real property or an interest therein. The English
rule, adopted with various modifications by several states,8 limits the recovery of
the purchaser in examining title; or, in other words, the vendee's out-of-pocket exdeposit paid by the pulrchaser, with interest, and reasonable expenses incurred by
the purchaser in examining title, or, in other words, the vendee's out-of-pocket expenses, the amount which would ordinarily be recoverable upon a rescission.0 The
"American rule," established in many states 10 (and the exception to the English
rule, which is applied when the vendor has acted in bad faith) follows the analogy
of sales of personal property and allows as general damages the loss of the bargain,
the value of the land at the agreed time for conveyance, minus the unpaid part of
the purchase price; or, in other words, the difference between the contract price and
the market value, plus any payments which have been made."
Although the decision in Flureau v. Thornhill'2 was based on the difficulties of

4. Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N. E. 153 (1916).
5. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). For a discussion of
the application of the rule in this leading case see 15 FORD. L. REv. 121 (1946).
6. See Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 48 L. Q. REv. 90, 94 (1932).
7. 2 W. B1. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776). The defendant contracted to sell a rent
issuing from a leasehold house but was unable to make title, and the purchaser sued for
damages for loss of the bargain, after refusing to take his deposit with interest, and his expenses, in satisfaction. The jury awarded such damages, contrary to the court's direction, and
a new trial was granted. DeGrey, C. J., announced the rule: "Upon a contract for a purchase,
if the title proves bad, and the vendor is (without fraud) incapable of making a good
one, I do not think that the purchaser can be entitled to any damages for the fancied
goodness of the bargain, which he supposes he has lost."
8. For instance: Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, 7 Ind. App. 280, 33 N. E. 808 (1893);
Foley v. McKeegan, 4 Iowa 1 (1856); Potts v. Moran's Executors, 236 Ky. 28, 32 S. W.
2d 534 (1930); Horner v. Beasley, 105 Md. 193, 65 AtI. 820 (1907); Gerbert v. Trustees of the Congregation of the Sons of Abraham, 59 N. J. Law 160, 35 Atl. 1121 (1896) ;
Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140 (1859); Seidlek v. Bradley, 293 Pa. 379, 142 AtI. 914
(1928); Boston v. DeJarnette, 153 Va. 591, 151 S. E. 146 (1930).
9. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 178 (rev. ed. 1935) ;1 C.ARx, NEW YORK LAW or DAMAors
§ 203 (1925).

10. Hamaker v. Coons, 117 Ala. 603, 23 So. 655 (1897); Wells v. Abernathy, 5 Conn.
222 (1824); Lyman v. Harvey, 12 Del. Ch. 129, 108 AtI. 850 (1919); Mobley v. Lott,
127 Ga. 572, 56 S. E. 637 (1907); Doherty v. Dolan, 65 Me. 87 (1876); Boyden v. Hill,
198 Mass. 477, 85 N. E. 413 (1908); McCarty v. Lingham, 111 Ohio St. 551, 146 N. E.
64 (1924) ; Dunshee v. Geohegan, 7 Utah 113, 25 Pac. 731 (1891).
11. 3 SEDWICK, DAMAGES § 1012 (9th ed. 1920).
12. 2 W. BI. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776). Blackstone, J., gave the reasoning upon
which the rule was apparently founded: "These contracts are merely upon condition,
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assuring a good title in England, where no adequate system of recording deeds and
conveyances was in effect, the principle set forth has continued to exert an influence. The English courts soon after the decision sought to relax the rule by holding that if the vendor, when he made the contract, knew that he did not have
complete title, he was to be held liable for the loss of the bargain.13 This tendency
toward conformity with the usual measure of damages in breach of contract cases
was temporarily checked in the English courts by the decision in the case of Bahi
v. Fothergil,1 ' 4 but the more recent decisions in England indicate a willingness to
give the buyer compensation for his loss of the bargain, even though the vendor is,
without fraud or bad faith, unable to complete the transaction.s These decisions
require more than good faith from the defaulting vendor at the time of the making
of the contract, and impose damages for loss of the bargain where the seller did
not do his best to remove title defects.' 0 New York in general follows the English
rule' 7 but here the rule is based upon the analogy between this class of cases and
actions for breach of covenant of warranty of title.' 8 The majority of American
jurisdictions, in the case of a breach of either the covenant of seizin or quiet enjoyment, will restrict the recovery of the grantee to the return of the purchase
price' 9 and accordingly it is considered improper to allow a vendee a greater recovery than would have been permitted to a grantee had the deed been delivered~2
frequently expressed, but always implied, that the vendor has a good title. If he has not,
the return of the deposit, with interest and costs, is all that can be expected." This explanation has been criticized, however, by Cockburn, C. J., in the case of Engell %.
Fitch, L. R. 3, Q. B. Cas. 314, 326 (1S69): "It certainly would have been more satisfactory
if, in a case laying down so important and at the same time exceptional a rule, the
judges had given the reasons of their decision as a guide in future cases."
13. Hopkins v. Grazebrook, 6 Barn. & C. 31, 10S Eng. Rep. 364 (K. B. 1826).
14. L. R. 7 H. L. 158, 43 L. J. N. S. 243 (Ex. 1S74).
15. Draybrooks v. Whaley, 1 K. B. 435 (1919); Daniel v. Vassall, 2 Ch. 405 (1917);
Day v. Singleton, 2 Ch. 320 (1S99). In the latter case, at 333, Lindey, At. R., spoke of this
as: "An anomalous rule based upon and justified by difficulties in shewing a good title to
real property in this country, but one which ought not to be extended to cascs in which
the reasons on which it is based do not apply."
16. Daniel v. Vassall, 2 Ch. 405 (1917), wherein the defaulting vendor was held liable
for loss of the bargain following failure to clear title by paying a mortgage indebtednes
which incumbered the property.
17. Walton v. Berry, 120 N. Y. 79, 23 N. E. 1115 (1890); Northridge v. Moore, 118
N. Y. 419, 23 N. E. 570 (1S90); Cockroft v. New York & Harlem R. IL, 69 N.

Y.

201 (1S77); Mlargruif v. Muir, 57 N. Y. 155 (1874); Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140
(1859); Lichenstein v. Davis, 237 App. Div. 894, 261 N. Y. Supp. 807 (2d Dep't 1933);
Schwinner v. Roth, 111 Mlisc. 654, 132 N. Y. Supp. 12 (Sup. CL 1920).
13. Conger v. Weaver 20 N. Y. 140, 144 (1359), Denio, J.: ". . . the ground mainly
relied on is the analogy between this class of actions and those upon covenants of title
inwhich it is well settled that the purchase money and interest only can be recovered,
however valuable the purchase may have been."
19. Pitcher v. Livingston, 4 Johns 1 (N. Y. 1S09); Staats v. Ten Eyck's E 'rs, 3
Caines 111 (N. Y. 1305). The sound basis for the rule was stated concisely by Kent, Ch. J.,
in the Staats case: "No man could venture to sell an acre of ground to a wealthy purchaser, without the hazard of absolute ruin."
20. "That there is no substantial difference in the injury resulting, where there is an
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The question as to when the vendor will be considered to have acted in bad faith
has been for the most part settled by the decisions, so that the vendor is generally
held liable for loss of the bargain, or the difference between the contract price and
the market value of the property, if the seller (a) arbitrarily refuses to perform,21
(b) knowingly contracts beyond his power,2 2 or (c) has been guilty of fraud or bad
faith at the time of the making of the contract.23 It is well understood that "loss
of the bargain," when used as a measure of damages is intended to compensate
the wronged party in money for the wrong suffered.24 And in cases involving the
breach of a contract dealing with land, where it is found that the vendor has not
acted in good faith, the wronged vendee should be put in as good a position as that
in which he would have been, if the contract had not been breached. 25
If the contract had not been breached, however, the vendee would have incurred
certain expenses in order to obtain the benefit of his bargain, such as expenses of
having the title searched, the payment of attorney's fees, broker's commissions, or,
in the instant case, the legal expense of applying for a liquor license. These expenses
are understood to be the cost of the contract to the vendee. The "loss of the bargain" is the profit he would have made on the, contract, if it had not been breached.
Therefore, a recovery such as that which the court in the principal case indicates
would be proper,26 i.e., the difference between the contract price and market value
of the property, plus the expenses incurred in reliance on the contract, is actually an
award of the profit, plus the expenses which the vendee would have incurred in any
event in order to realize the profit. In such a case the plaintiff is being placed in a
better monetary position than that in which he would have been had no breach occurred. 27 The measure of damages proposed in the instant case was actually applied
ouster after conveyance with warranty, and where there is a refusal of conveyance In pursuance of the contract to convey, when the vendor is unable to make title, which can
reasonably support a rule for damages in the former case wholly different from that which
prevails in the latter case, is too obvious to require discussion. The injury in both cases
is the same,--the loss of the property; the loss of such profit as would have been incident
to increased value." Gerbert v. Trustees of the Congregation of the Sons of Abraham, 59
N. J. L. 160, 35 AtI. 1121 (1896).
21. Sloan v. Baird, 162 N. Y. 327, 56 N. E. 752 (1900), wherein the defendant, in violation of the contract to sell land and buildings to the plaintiff, conveyed to a third party.
The court stated that the measure of damages was the difference between the amount
which the plaintiff agreed to pay and the value of the property.
22. Pumpelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59 (1869), wherein a trustee, acting on the assurance
of the cestui que trust that he need not consult her about the sale of any lands belonging to the trust estate but should confer with her husband on the subject, contracted to
convey, and the cestui que trust then refused her consent; the court held the trustee
personally responsible for the loss of the bargain to the vendee.
23. Bush v. Cole, 28 N. Y. 261 (1863), wherein an auctioneer, who sold land at less
than the price fixed by the owner who then refused to convey, was held liable to the
purchaser for the difference between the agreed price and the value of the land.
24. United States v. Burton Coal Co., 273 U. S.337 (1927).
25. Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140 (1859).
26. "As damages, the plaintiffs are entitled to the difference between the contract
price and the market value of the real and personal property involved, together with the
reasonable legal and other expenses necessarily incurred in reliance on the contracts of sale."
De Cesare v. Occhiuto, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 675, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
27. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S.540 (1903).
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and, what was apparently a double recovery, allowed in several cases decided prior
to 193 1 .2s However, the Court of Appeals, in that year, in the case of Schtffz & Sot
v. tNelson,2 9 wherein the vendor was found to have acted in bad faith, stated
the correct rule: "The plaintiff cannot have the profits and also recover for counsel
fees and title search. It has received by this judgment the same benefits it would
have had if the contract had been carried out and the property deeded to it. Under
such conditions the plaintiff would have paid the counsel fees and the cost of a title
search. Having 'received all the benefits in the form of the $500 profit, it lihewise
must stand this expense."
The court's misstatement of the general rule led it into an apparent error. As
noted in the quotation from the Schultz case the plaintiff should not be permitted
to recover expenses, in a suit wherein he recovers lost profits; this would result
in an award of more than compensation. Only nominal damages, in any action based

on the contract, may be recovered wherein it is found that the contract, if com-

0
pleted, would have caused the plaintiff to suffer a net loss.
The court in the instant case apparently allowed a recovery on the contract, as
indicated by its reference to the sum recovered as "damages," despite the finding
that there was no difference between the contract price and the market value, i.e.,
no lost profit. A persuasive, but misleading, argument for such a recovery might be
made on the theory that the defendant has led the plaintiff to incur expenses in reliance on the contract. However, even though the expenses were incurred in
reliance upon the contract, the plaintiff should not be permitted to shift to the defendant the loss which would have resulted even if the contract had been completed. 31 To conclude that the plaintiff in the instant case should not have been
permitted to recover on the contract is not to deny any recovery, however; a recovery might be allowed on the theory of a rescission in pais. Perhaps the court
proceeded on the theory of such an executed rescission, and on this theory, the
recovery of expenses, when fulfillment of the contract would not have resulted in
32
But, after rescission, the theory of recovery
a profit, is supported by authority.
is quasi-contractual, which generally depends upon a showing that the plaintiff was
3
unjustly enriched at the plaintiff's e.xpense. 3 Strict application of the theory of
restitution would negative a recovery in the instant case, as the defendant has not
been benefited by the incidental expenditures made by the plaintiff. The modem
tendency, however, where rescission is permitted because of fraud, is to give re-

28. See note 2 sapra.
29. 256 N. Y. 473, 476, 477, 177 N. E. 9, 10 (1931).
30. REsTAT=MEr, CoxNRAcTs § 333 (1932): "If full performance would have resulted in a net loss to the plaintiff, the amount of this loss must be deducted, the burden
of proof being on the defendant."
31. Fuller and Purdue, The Riance Element in Contract Damages, 46 YArz L. J.
52, 79 (1936): "We will not in a suit for reimbursement for losses incurred in reliance
on a contract knowingly put the plaintiff in a better position than be would have occupied had the contract been fully performed."
32.

Rabinowitz v. Marcus, 100 Conn. 86, 123 AtI. 21 (1923).

In

this case, testimony

disclosed that the land had a less value on the dosing day than the purchase price named
in the agreement. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was permitted to recover expens . The
court expressly differentiated between recovery on the contract and on the theory of rescission, and granted recovery on the latter.
33. WooDwA.D, Q. ASI CONTRACTS § 3 (1913); Note, 44 Himv L. Rcv. 623 (1930).
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covery of incidental expenditures incurred as a result of entering into the contract,8 4 &hd, whatever the theory, the result seems to be just and proper.

DOMESTIC

RELATIONS-FOREIGN

DIVORCE-INJUNCTION

TO

RESTRAIN

FOREION

SurT.-The plaintiff and defendant were married in New York and continued to reside there until 1944 when the plaintiff obtained a decree of separation from the
defendant. The defendant fell in arrears in the payment of alimony and contempt
proceedings were begun. While these proceedings were pending, a copy of a summons and complaint in an action for absolute divorce brought by the defendant in
Nevada was delivered to the plaintiff in New York. Plaintiff then brought this
action for injunctive relief to restrain the defendant from proceeding with the foreign action. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant's assertion of bona fide domicile
in the foreign jurisdiction was a sham and that without injunctive relief she would
be compelled to sustain her property rights secured by the New York judgment
before the courts of Nevada. From an order denying her motion for a temporary injunction, plaintiff appealed. Held, one justice dissenting, order reversed and the
motion granted. Pereira v. Pereira, 70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (App. Div. 1st Dep't
1947).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a recent case,' said: "Conflict of Law problems have a
beguiling tendency to be made even more complicated than they are." Especially is
this true on the question of the validity of foreign divorces, 2 despite the attempt
of the Supreme Court in the recent Williams cases8 to dissipate the confusion surrounding this branch of the law.
The precise question presented in the instant case may be stated as follows: Should
the courts of New York grant a temporary injunction to prevent a spouse from obtaining a divorce in a foreign state in order that the bona fides of his claim of domicile may be tested in New York?
In answering this question in the affirmative, the Appellate Division maintains
that the controversial decision in the case of Goldstein v. Goldstehri has been rendered inapplicable by the first Williams case. Justice Van Voorhis dissents on the
ground that the New York rule has not been affected by the Williams cases. Any
consideration of these divergent views necessitates a review of Haddock v. Haddock
34. But see Wiegel v. Cook, 237 N. Y. 136, 142 N. E. 444 (1923), in which the court
granted equitable rescission of the fraudulent realty contract after the plaintiff had been
in possession for several months, but denied a recovery of expenditures incurred by the
plaintiff during occupation.
1. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U. S. 156, 169 (1946).
2. ". . . Domicil thus combines the essentially contradictory elements of permanence
and instantaneous change. No legal conception, save possibly 'jurisdiction,' of which It Is
an elusive substratum, affords such possibilities for uncertain application." Dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 244,
258 (1945).

3. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), and Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U. S. 226 (1945).

4. 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940) ; see note 9 infra.
5. 201 U. S.562 (1906).
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which was the law at the time the Goldstein case was resolved, and which was expressly overruled in the first Williams case.
In the Haddock case, a husband and wife were domiciled in Nev, York. The husband wrongfully left the wife, acquired a domicile in Connecticut and there obtained a divorce based on constructive service. The wife remained domiciled in
New York and never appeared in the action. In a subsequent separation action in
New York in which the defendant husband was served personally within the state
he pleaded the Connecticut divorce. On appeal the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the New York decision and held that a suit for divorce brought in a state
other than that of the matrimonial domicile,0 against a wife who is still domiciled
therein, confers no jurisdiction of the subject matter nor of the person of the defendant and the courts of sister states are not required by virtue of the full faith
and credit clause7 of the Constitution to give effect to such a decree. The Court
held ,that where the husband wrongfully abandons his wife and goes into another
state, such other state does not become that of the matrimonial domicile. 8
The Goldstein case, decided thereafter, presented facts almost identical to
those in the instant case. The wife alleged in a petition for a permanent injunction
to restrain her spouse from prosecuting an action for divorce in Florida that the
parties were married in New York, that the defendant without provocation had abandoned her and that she had been served by mail in the Florida action. She further
alleged that she ". . . will be irreparably damaged and will be apparently deposed
of her status as the wife of the defendant herein and of her property rights. '
The New York Court of Appeals held, Judges Loughran and Conway dissenting,lo
that ". . . on these facts the Courts of the State of Florida are wholly without
jurisdiction to render a valid divorce against the plaintiff. Florida is not their matrimonial domicile. Haddock v. Haddock. . . . Neither of the parties is a resident of
that state. The plaintiff has nothing to fear from the action which her husband has
6. "From the language used in the Supreme Court's decisions, it seems that 'matrimonial
domicile' means nothing more than the place where the parties last lived together as husband and wife with the intent of making that place their home, and which was still the
domicile of one spouse when the divorce action was brought." GooDnicir, Co:mr.xc or
LAws 295 (1st ed. 1927).
7. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of every other state." U. S. Co:,s'. Art IV, § 1.
8. In Perkins v. Perkins, 225 Mass. 32, 113 N. E. 841, 842 (1916), the court said: "His
desertion was a wrong against her marital rights and enabled her to keep the old matrimonial domicile regardless of the fiction that the domicile of the wife commonly follows
that of the husband."
9. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 151, 27 N. E. 2d 969, 971 (1940).
10. The dissenting judges vigorously assert that the plaintiff would be caused more
than mere annoyance. Judge Conway says: ". . . the mere fact that a husband has secured a divorce from his wife gives ground for suspicion at least of the virtue and fidelity
A wife who has given no ground for
of the latter, on the part of the general public....
divorce in this State . . . should not be exposed to the humiliation and doubt as to her
status raised by a judgment of divorce in another State, even if fraudulently obtained
and invalid here." Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 153, 27 N. E. 2d 969, 972 (1940).
For an excellent criticism of this case see a comment by Professor I. Maurice Wormser in
9 FoRD. L. REV. 376 wherein he defends the minority position.
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sought to bring against her in Florida for on her statement a judgment entered therein would be a nullity."' 1
If the instant case had arisen prior to the Williams cases, the Appellate Division
would have felt itself bound by the Goldstein decision. Since Nevada was not the
matrimonial domicile 12 any decree rendered therein would have been a nullity and
therefore under the Goldstein rule the plaintiff would have nothing to fear and no
injunction would issue. We must then examine the Williams cases to ascertain
whether or not they have effected a change in the law so as to render the Goldstein
rule inapplicable.
The pronouncements of law in Williams v. North Carolina (1)13 are substantially
that regardless of where the matrimonial domicile is or who is At fault, when one
spouse has set up a bona fide domicile in another state and a decree of divorce is
granted, such a decree is entitled to full faith and credit in the sister states even
if the other spouse is served constructively. The Court held that a decree rendered
under such circumstances is entitled prima facie to extra-territorial validity and
recognition. In Williams v. North Carolina (I1),14 the Supreme Court ruled that the
question of the bona fides of the domicile of the one obtaining the divorce can still
be collaterally attacked in the courts of the sister states.
The dissent in the principal case holds that if what the plaintiff alleges is true,
then any decree the husband obtains would be void under the second Williams case
O 5
and therefore could not injure her under the Goldstein rule.
Applying the Williams decisions to the instant case, if the husband were to obtain
a Nevada divorce, even though his residence might be a sham, it would, until collaterally attacked and overthrown, be a valid decree entitled to full faith and credit
in the courts of New York,'0 the plaintiff would be a divorced woman and her
11. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 283 N. Y. 146, 148, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940).
12. A decree of separation is a judgment in personam, it does not affect the marital
status, but only the obligation of the parties to live together. Pettis v. Pettls, 91 Conn.
608, 101 Atl. 13 (1917) ; Barrere v. Barrere, 4 John's Ch. 187 (N. Y. 1819). Therefore,
when the husband went to Nevada, he could not take the matrimonial domicile with him
because of the separation decree. Vischer v. Vischer, 12 Barb. Ch. 640 (N. Y. 1851); REsrAZmENT, CoNmIcT or LAWS §§ 28, 29 (1934).
13. 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
14. 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
15. The minority justice in the instant case apparently does not concede the effect of
the argument advanced by the majority that under the Williams cases, a decree once rendered by a foreign state with due process, even if the domicile is a sham, is not void but
voidable. The language of the first Williams case would seem to be susceptible of no other
fair interpretation and the second Williams case did not purport to change the first decision, but rather to clarify it by allowing collateral attack. Until such attack Is successfully made, the decree is valid. The argument that under the Haddock rule a decree was
not void, because the states had the option of recognizing it, has no force or effect in
New York because the policy of the courts of New York in refusing to recognize such
decrees is embodied in the Court of Appeals decision in Haddock v. Haddock, originally
a New York case.
16. In Allan v. Allan, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 924, 927 (Sup. Ct. 1946), a decree of separation
had been granted in New York. The wife brought suit to restrain the defendant from
proceeding with a divorce action in another state. Justice Johnson said: ".. .since the
Williams case, this defendant can present in this court a certified copy of a decree he thus
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property rights under the separation decree might well be jeopardized. It may be
seen that the underlying distinction between this case and the Goldstein case is that
under the Haddock rule, the decree would be void when made and would be void
even if never examined by the New York Courts while under the Williams cases a
decree rendered by a foreign state would no longer be void, but merely voidable and
hence valid until collaterally attacked and upset.17 With this distinction in mind the
Appellate Division in the principal case was able to hold that the Goldstein case
was no longer applicable and then to consider if there existed any necessity for the
present intervention of a court of equity.'s The court found such a necessity in
the possibility of irreparable harm' 9 which might be done to the plaintiff if the
husband were allowed to continue a suit allegedly based on fraud.
It is submitted that the majority of the court in the principal case have e-xpressed
the sounder and more equitable view. No longer is a foreign decree obtained through
a fictitious domicile automatically and categorically void. It is on the contrary prima
facie valid until proved otherwise and the burden of this proof rests heavily on the
innocent spouse. It would seem that a present test of domicile would be more equitable than to allow a presumption of validity to attach to a decree obtained by fraud,
whereby one spouse by taking unjust advantage would thus jeopardize rights previously secured by the New York courts.20
obtained that we must bow to ... It will no longer be possible in this court to enforce
its own judgment without asking the plaintiff therein to set aside that decree as invalid."
In Matter of Holmes Estate, 291 N. Y. 261, 52 N. E. 2d 424 (1943), the New York Court
of Appeals observed that the "adjudged policy" of this state as evidenced by the Haddock
rule, was applied by the New York Courts until December 1942. when Haddock v. Haldock was overruled.
17. Since the decision in the first Williams case, the lower courts of New York have
consistently held that the authority of the Goldstein case is no longer free from doubt, and
on facts the same as or similar to those in the principal case have consistently granted an
injunction. Holmes v. Holmes, 46 N. Y. S. 2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Maloney v. Maloney,
51 N. Y. S. 2d 4 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Oltarsh v. 01tarsh, 181 Misc. 255, 43 N. Y. S. 2d S01
(Sup. Ct. 1943) ; Adams v. Adams, ISO Misc. 578, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 266 (Sup. CL 1943). In
Ciacco v. Ciacco, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 393 (Sup. CL 1944), the court said: "Before the Williams
case, the plaintiff in her action needed only to allege that this state was the matrimonial
domicile the burden was then placed upon the defendant to show that the foreign decree
was good."
18. The reasons the court advanced for intervening were the following: (1) if the
decree were to issue, the plaintiff here would be under the burden of upsetting the presumption of validity that would attach; (2) the court now has jurisdiction over the
parties which it may not be able to obtain later; (3) the wife has her witnesses and
proof in New York at this time which evidence she may be unable to produce later;
and (4) her rights obtained under the separation decree might be jeopardized by a suit
in a foreign court based on fraud and sham.
19. When acts are threatened which subject the plaintiff to irreparable damage, an
injunction against foreign suits will issue. REsrArs!.rET. Co:,r zcT or LAvs § 96 (1934).

20. The exact point involved in the instant case seems not to have arisen in any other
jurisdiction since the second Williams case was decided. The tendency in other jurizdictions, however, has always been in opposition to the holding of the Goldsteci case. See,
e.g., Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 4S0, 13 A. 2d 738 (1940); Kempson v. Kempson, 58 N. J. Eq.
94, 43 At. 97 (Ch. 1399); Borda v. Borda, 44 R. I. 337, 117 At. 362 (1922). Injunctive
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OF PREsMISES.-Plaintiff landlord leased business premises to defendant, the term
running from April 1, 1946 to Sept. 30, 1949. Due to adverse business conditions
the tenant in possession sought a release from his obligations under the lease and
the parties signed a formal agreement of surrender and release by which the premises
were to be vacated on or before Jan. 1, 1947. The tenant did not vacate as agreed,

and the landlord brought this summary proceeding to -recover possession. Defendant's motion to dismiss the landlord's petition for insufficiency on its face was granted in the lower court. Upon appeal, held, one justice dissenting, affirmed. White Way
Arcade, Inc. v. Broadway Turtle King, Inc., 71 N. Y. S. 2d 788 (App. Term 1st
Dep't 1947).

Section 8 of the New York Business Rent Control Law1 provides in pertinent
part that: "So long as the tenant continues to pay rent . . . no tenant shall be removed from any business space, by action or proceeding to evict or to recover
possession or otherwise . . . regardless of any contract, lease, agreement, or obligation heretofore or hereafter entered into which is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this act. ... "2

Since the affirmance was without opinion the reasoning of the majority can be
inferred only from the fact that the petition was dismissed for insufficiency on its
face. Two inferences are possible: (1) the landlord could recover possession only
under one of the provisions of Section 8; or, (2) the surrender and release agreement
3
was inconsistent with the act.
With respect to the first inference, the dissenting opinion states that the Business
Rent Control Law was never intended to apply to a situation of the type here pre-

sented, i.e., where the tenant seeks the release. Such absence of intent is evidenced
by the preamble contained in Section 1 of the Business Rent Law which reads in the
part related to this discussion as follows: "Unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive leases
and agreements for the payment of rent . . . having been and now being exacted by
landlords . . . whereby breakdown has taken place in normal' processes of bargaining and freedom of contract has become an illusory concept. . . Y4 The dissenting
relief was granted in the above cases where, as in the Goldstein case, a foreign decree
would be a nullity. It is fair to assume that these courts, a fortiori, will continue to enjoin when such decrees must be recognized as valid until proved otherwise. It is interesting to note however that the Goldstein case has been held to be still applicable to "mall
order" foreign decrees. Armetta v. Armetta, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 880 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
1. N. Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS § 8558.
2. (Italics supplied). The numerous subdivisions which permit a landlord to recover
possession of premises would seem to be inapplicable to the facts before the court in the
instant case. In any event, the plaintiff did not base his proceeding upon any of them.
3. It should be noted that § 12 of the Business Rent Control Law (N. Y. Unconsolidated
Laws § 8562) provides in part that "Any waiver of any of the provisions of this act
shall be unenforceable and void." This provision, however, would appear to be inapplicable because certainly the voluntary surrender of the premises at the tenant's request does
not constitute a waiver of the provisions of the statute. It does constitute a waiver of tie
protection of the statute but this seems to be permissible. See Petti v. Gross, 62 N. Y. S.
2d 13 (Sup. Ct. 1946); cI, Gilroy v. Becker, 186 Misc. 93, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 328 (App. Term
1st Dep't 1945), where the tenant's attorney consented to a final order in a proceeding
where the landlord's petition was defective on its face.
4.

N. Y. UNCONSOLIDATED LAWS § 8551.
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opinion indicates further that the clear inference to be drawn from Section 8 is that
an agreement not inconsistent with the Act should be honored, and asserts that a
surrender and release, especially when requested by the tenant, is not inconsistent
with any provision of the statute.
It is submitted in answer to the first of the two possible inferences to be drawn
from the majority opinion, i.e., that the landlord could recover possession only under
one of the provisions of Section 8 that such theory is an interpretation of the Business Rent Control Law which looks only to Section 8 of said statute, and prescinds
completely from the statute taken as a whole,ri especially from Section 1 in which
the intention of the legislature has been clearly indicated.0 In the instant case there
does not appear to have been an unjust or unreasonable agreement for rent esacted
by the landlord, nor was there any apparent breakdown in the normal processes of
bargaining,7 since the tenant itself freely sought the release. The surrender and release agreement of itself should have been sufficient to support the petitioner's case,
if it was not inconsistent with the Business Rent Control Law.
The second inference, i.e., that the surrender and release agreement was inconsistent with Section 8 of the Business Rent Control Law presents the following question:
Is a surrender and release agreement inconsistent with said law when requested by a
tenant? s Whether or not a certain set of facts is to be controlled by particular legis-

5. BLAcE, CoxsTmcnoN tN- LvraumaToN or LAws § 99 (2d ed. 1911) ("In the
construction of a statute, in order to determine the true intention of the k'gislature, the
particular clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must he considered in fixing the meaning
of any of its parts.") See People v. Long Island Ry., 194 N. Y. 130, 137, 37 N. E. 79, 82
(1909), wherein it was said that a particular provision of an act is not to receive special
meaning at variance with the general purpose and spirit of the entire act. See Sharkey v.
Thurston, 263 N. Y. 123, 127, 196 N. E. 766, 76S (1935), where Lehman, J., observed:
"In statutory construction the courts endeavor to give effect to the legislative intent. In
the absence of language so clear that it allows no room for construction, the courts will
not ascribe to the Legislature, an intention which is contrary to general and well-established rules of justice and fairness. . . ." See Alberene Stone Co. v. Bd. of Ed. of City of
N. Y., 153 Misc. 312, 316, 276 N. Y. Supp. 29, 34 (Sup. Ct. 1934), aif'd Uilsout onibron
sub nowz. Alberene Stone Co. v. Grinnell Co., 244 App. Div. 711, 279 N. Y. Supp. 976
(1st Dep't 1935). "It is an elementary canon of statutory construction that all portions
or parts of an act must be considered together and that even though a statute be divided
into many sections, each section must he construed in the light of the other sections and
each section is to be kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment."
6. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
7. Kesbec, Inc. v. City of New York, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 900, 02 (Sup. Ct. 1946). In denying
a licensee's petition to remain in possession of business premises, the court pointed out the
intent of the legislature ". . . to alleviate the condition wherein 'unjust, unreasonable and
oppressive leases and agreements for the payment of rents' . . . were and are 'now being
exacted by landlords... .' See, also, 20th Century Associates v. Waldman, 294 N. Y. 571,
531, 63 N. E. 2d 177, 179 (1945). In light of evidence before the Legislature as to the unreasonable, oppressive and unjust agreements, the court said: "'So far as such tenants are
concerned, the Legislature was justified in concluding there vas no reality of consent; that
their 'freedom of contract' had become an illusory concept...
S. The case of a formal voluntary surrender of the premises by a 'enant must, of
course, be distinguished from the termination of a lease by its own terms. It is in such a
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lation depends in part upon the presence in that set of facts of conditions which the
legislature sought to remedyY
0
Borchard Affiliations, Inc. v. Normandy Democratic Club, Inc.1 offers a precise
illustration of the situation which the law was designed to correct. There the landlord, pursuant to a covenant contained in the lease, exercised his option to terminate
the lease and upon the tenant's refusal to vacate the premises brought an action
to enforce the tenant's covenant to surrender. The relief sought was denied by the
court. The landlord's option to terminate the lease and the tenant's covenant to
surrender possession were conditions precedent to the obtaining of the lease. It was
precisely because there had been a breakdown in the normal processes of bargaining for leases whereby freedom of contract had become an illusory concept that the
landlord was able to place such a provision in the lease and thus force his will upon
his prospective tenant. Such an agreement would clearly be inconsistent with the law
since enforcement of it would destroy the very purpose for which the law had
been enacted. In the principal case, however, the facts appear to be entirely different. Here, the surrender and release agreement was not a covenant of the original
lease but rather a separate agreement. *It was not forced upon the tenant, but
rather requested by it. Nor was there a restriction of the tenant's freedom of contract but rathet an exercise of it.
There have been other instances in which the Business Rent Control Law has been
held inapplicable. In Petti v. Gross" where the tenant had voluntarily effected a
physical surrender of the premises, the court would not allow him to invoke protec2
tion of the provisions of the Business Rent Control Law.' In Messenger v. Great
Hudso Fur Company' a the court, in refusing to apply the Business Rent Control
case that the emergency legislation is intended to apply, the tenant being permitted to
remain in possession as a "statutory tenant." Stern v. Equitable Trust Co., 208 App. Div.
13, 203 N. Y. Supp. 91 (1st Dep't 1924), aff'd, 238 N. Y. 267, 144 N. E. 578 (1924).
1 9. In re McGrath, 186 Misc. 27, 31, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 876, 879 (Sup. Ct. 1945), citing with
approval the following language of the Court of Appeals in Dean v. Metropolitan El. Ry,,
119 N. Y. 540, 547, 23 N. E. 1054, 1055 (1890): "The legislation is obviously a stricture
on the old common law right of a landlord to freely contract for the use of 'his land and
must, therefore, be strictly construed so far as what the Legislature intended to embrace within the provisions of this enactment. The Legislature may not be presumed to make any innovation upon the common law further than is required by the mischief to be remedied."
In May v. Dermont, 114 Misc. 106, 108, 109, 186 N. Y. Supp. 113, 115 (Sup. Ct. 1921),
which construed N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 942, (Domestic Rent Laws), Lehman, J., pointed
out: "The statute under consideration is a remedial and not a penal statute, but It was
enacted to meet an extraordinary emergency by remedies of an extraordinary nature, and
in construing the statute we are justified in assuming that the legislature never intended
that its provisions should apply to cases where they could not constitute a remedy for
the conditions which the legislature sought to relieve."
10. 65 N. Y. S. 2d 415 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
11. 62 N. Y. S. 2d 13 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
12. The court said (id. at 16): "Having voluntarily terminated the relationship, the
plaintiff cannot complain that, in the language of the Emergency Rent Law, the condition in which he subsequently found himself arose from a 'breakdown . . . in normal processes of bargaining and freedom of contract.'"
13. 270 App. Div. 168, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 46 (1st Dep't 1945).
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Law to a case where a landlord sought to evict a gratuitous licensee, stated that the
statute was never intended to be applied to such a situation.' 4
It is submitted, therefore, that the court in the principal case erred in applying
the Business Rent Control Law to a situation which would seem hardly to have been
one for which the legislature had sought to provide protection.

TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-TTRACTIVE NuisANcE.-Defendant was a lessee in possession
of a warehouse. Two employees of defendant, engaged for appromdmately two weeks in
painting the interior, were aware that deceased and other children on a number of days
played in and about the entrance to the building. On the day of the accident the employees, while sitting on the floor of a freight elevator, chatted with the children and
then went farther inside the elevator and sent it to the third floor. Deceased and another
child also entered the elevator and the deceased fell through a seven inch space between an unprotected side of the elevator and the wall of the building. The trial
court charged that the defendant would be liable only if the employees actually knew
of the presence of the children. A verdict was found for the defendant. Upon appeal, held, judgment reversed. The case was remanded with instructions that the
jury be charged in accordance with the provisions of Section 339, Restatement
of the Law of Torts. Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 271 App. Div. 122, 63
N. Y. S. 2d 597 (3d Dep't 1946).
As a general rule an occupier of land owes to trespassers no greater duty than to
refrain from inflicting wilful or wanton injury.' This duty is owed alike to infant
and adult intruders. 2 To afford to the young child a greater measure of protection
against the effects of his own immature judgment, the courts of many jurisdictions,
however, recognize, as a limitation on the mentioned rule, the doctrine of attractive
nuisance. This doctrine creates in the occupier of land, under limited conditions, a
duty of greater care toward trespassing children whose presence should have been
anticipated. 3 Although there is a lack of harmony relative to the precise circum-

14. Defendant, it may fairly be inferred, was merely a gratuitous licensee. The Commercial Rent Law has no application to such a relationship. The statute relate3 only to
"actions, proceedings and related matters involving unjust, unreasonable and oppressive
rents or agreements for rent with regard to premises used or occupied for commercial purposes. ... The complaint states the cause of action and should not have been dismiseQd."
Messinger v. Great Hudson Fur Co., 270 App. Div. 16S, 169, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 46, 47 (1st
Dep't 1946); accord, W. M. C. A., Inc. v. Bloctfront Realty Corp., 67 N. Y. S. 2d SG7
(Sup. Ct. 1946), wherein the court refused to protect the tenant who was not in phy-iaml
possession of rentable space in spite of the fact that the Business Rent Control Law does
not specifically exclude such tenants, on the ground that those laws, in light of their
objects, were not intended to cover such a case.
1. Giannini v. Campodonico, 176 Cal. 54S, 169 Pac. SO (1917).
2. Buch v. Amory Mlfg. Co., 69 N. H. 257, 44 AUt. S09 (IS93).
3. Standard Steel Works v. Chicago, A. & E. R. IL, 29 F. Supp. 297 (N. D. IMI.1939).
The following theories have been advanced to justify the effect of the doctrine: the alluring condition is an invitation to enter, Koppelkom v. Colo. Cement Pipe Co., 16 Colo.
App. 274, 64 Pac. 1047 (1901); the situation is a trap or pitfall created to injure
and therefore the exception to the general rule applies, Faylor v. Great Eatern Quicksilver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919); the courts should not subject
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stances necessary to the applicability of the doctrine, it is generally held that the
1
condition causing the harm must be attractive and dangerous to children' and one
5
doctrine is
The
that can be rendered harmless by simple precautionary measures.
invoked only in the case of children of tender years0 whose presence the owner has
reason to anticipate. 7 Although the courts have set no arbitrary age beyond which
the doctrine will not be applied 8 it has been said that the child must be incapable
0
of exercising discretion and be unable to appreciate the danger involved. Even in
10
it
cautiously,
invoked
those jurisdictions where the doctrine is law, the courts have
and a party must bring himself strictly within its requirements" in order to avail
himself of its protection.
The New York Court of Appeals has expressly rejected the doctrine of attractive nuisance, such disapproval finding early articulation in the case of Walshs v.
2
Fitchburg R. R.,1 involving injury to an infant sustained while playing on a turn-

table. This position, followed consistently 13 in subsequent cases, was more recently

children to the harsh general rule, Lyttle v. Harlan Town Coal Co., 167 Ky. 345, 180 S. W.
519 (1915) ; one must use his property so as not to injure others, Bjork v. City of Tacoma,
76 XVash. 225, 135 Pac. 1005 (1913).
4. Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896) ; Schulte v. Willow River Power
Co., 234 Wis. 188, 290 N. W. 629 (1940).
5. Brown v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., 135 Ky. 798, 123 S. W. 298 (1909).
6. Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89, 182 N. E. 547 (1932).
7. Standard Steel Works v. Chicago, A. & E. R. R., 29 F. Supp. 297 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
8. Pierce v. United G. & E. Co., 161 Cal. 176, 118 Pac. 700 (1911). The court stated
that it could not be said as a matter of law that a boy thirteen years old was not within
the protection of the doctrine. See Smith v. Hopkins, 120 Fed. 921 (C. C. A. 7th 1902),
and Wimberly v. Gulf Production Co., 274 S. W. 986 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925), in which It was
said that the doctrine does not apply to a boy eighteen or more years of age. Although there
is a presumption that a child over fourteen years of age is capable of exercising Judgment,
Central of Georgia R. R. v. Robbins, 209 Ala. 6, 95 So. 367 (1923), that presumption
may be rebutted by showing undeveloped mental condition, Louisville & N. R. R. v.
Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S. W. 175 (1927).
9. In Wilmes v. Chicago G. W. R. R., 175 Ia. 101, 156 N. W. 877 (1916), it was said:
"These cases of attractive nuisance deal only with children who are not sufficiently mature
and discreet to have legal capacity to assume risk. If one is of mature age or of sufficient
age to know and appreciate the danger that attended his act, even though attracted by
the instrumentality, he cannot complain if he is injured. He cannot go into a place the
danger of which he appreciated and understands, even though attracted to it, and recover if be is injured."
10. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Van Britt, 258 U. S. 268 (1922); PRoSSER, TorTS
620 (1941).
11. Erickson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. M. R. R., 165 Minn. 106, 205 N. W. 889 (1925).
12, 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
12. 145 N. Y. 301, 39 N. E. 1068 (1895).
13. Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros. Inc., 288 N. Y. 16, 41 N. E. 2d 161 (1942);
Zaia v. Lalex Realty Corp., 287 N. Y. 689, 39 N. E. 2d 300 (1942) ; Bowers v. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co., 282 N. Y. 442, 26 N. E. 2d 970 (1940). In Parnell v. Holland Furnace

Co., 260 N. Y. 604, 184 N. E. 112 (1932), the affirmance by the court of judgment for
the plaintiff seems inconsistent with the position elsewhere taken by the Court of Appeals.

It is to be noted, however, that no opinion was rendered and that the plaintiff had been
invited to play in the area by one having equal rights therein with the defendant.
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restated by Judge Lehman in Morse v. Buffalo Tanh Corp.'4 in his declaration that
"The plaintiff's cause of action does not depend upon the doctrine of 'attractive nuisance.' That doctrine has been rejected in this State."
Apparent awareness on the part of the court in the instant case of the status of the
attractive nuisance doctrine in New York is reflected in its statement that: "If the principles laid down in much case law in regard to the maintenance of places attractive
to children, and the degree of care owing to a trespasser, are rigidly applied, then a
correct charge was given."' 5 The court then proceeds to declare that the jury should
have been charged in accordance with the rule of law set forth in Section 339 of the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, which it quotes at length without qualification,
exception or addition.' 0
Examination of this section of the Restatement, however, indicates that it is essentially a restatement of the principles of case law relating to the doctrine of attractive
nuisance. As a matter of fact, the rules and requirements as set forth by this section
present the doctrine in a form more favorable to the infant plaintiff than is recognized by many of the jurisdictions which profess to adhere thereto.11 So, for example, some jurisdictions insist that the enticement invite the trespass.18 Under the
doctrine of the Restatement the occupier of land is liable even though the enticement was discovered after the trespass had been committed.' 9 Again, some courts
14. 230 N. Y. 110, 19 N. E. 2d 981 (1939).
15. Clifton v. Patroon Operating Corp., 271 App. Div. 122, 123, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 597, 601
o
(3d Dep't 1946).
16. R.sTAr E T, ToRTs § 339 (1934) reads: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or
other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if (a) the place where the
condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that such
children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which the pofceccor knows
or should know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable rizWk
of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and (c) the children because of their
youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it
or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the poazcor
of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children
involved therein."
17. Under the Restatement a child is disqualified when he appreciated the "full extent"
of the risk involved. RxsT.,zTsmm, ToRTs § 339, comments b and e (1934); cf. Cahi v.
E. B. & A. L. Stone & Co., 153 Cal. 571, 96 Pac. 84 (1903); Faylor v. Great Eastern
Quicksilver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919). Also see note 9 svpra.
Comment d of § 339 of the Restatement suggests that where a condition is of such a
character that it would be deceptive to adults or would not be discovered by the exerce
of care required of adults, the peculiar danger to children lies not in the nature of the condition but in the fact that children are more prone to trespass. It is, however, prcisely the
nature of the condition which creates the duty under the doctrine of attractive nuizance
as traditionally understood.
13. United Zinc Chemical Co. v. Van Britt, 253 U. S. 263 (1922). See Hull v. Gillioz,
344 Mlo. 1227, 130 S. W. 2d 623 (1939), in which the court said that in view of the
law of attractive nuisance as it exists in that state the Restatement goes too far and
that the condition must induce the trespass. Accord, Esquibel v. City of Denver,
112 Colo. 546, 151 P. 2d 757 (1944).
19. REsTATEm-NT, ToRTs § 339, comment a (1934).
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have held that the agency which harms the trespasser must be identical with that
which lured him.20 The Restatement, however, does not invoke this limitation.2 1
The rule of the Restatement on this subject had not previously gone unnoticed
by the New York courts. In each of the cases citing the Restatement on this point,
however, it would seem that the reference thereto was obiter22 or that the infant
was already in the status of an invitee.23 The reference to the tentative draft in
Mendelouitz v. Neisner,2 4 cited by the court in the instant case, is clearly not an
adoption of the rule. And although on several occasions opportunity had been
presented to the Court of Appeals to discuss the Restatement's position on the doctrine,25 the decisions of that court are devoid of other reference thereto.
The decision in the instant case represents, then, an attempt to avoid by indirection the rule of stare decisis and to establish as law a doctrine repeatedly rejected
by the highest court of the state. That its purported authority therefrom was
illusory and its attempt
unwarranted has since been clearly demonstrated by the
26
Court of Appeals.
20. Seymour v. Union Stockyards & Transit Co., 224 Ill. 579, 79 N. E. 950 (1906);
Kansas City, Ft. Scott & Memphis R. R. v. Matson, 68 Kan. 815, 75 Pac. 503 (1904);
Smartwood v. Louisville & M. R. R., 129 Ky. 247, 111 S. W. 305 (1908). In Salt River
Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Compton, 40 Ariz. 282, 11 P. 2d 839 (1932), the court held
that a boy who climbed a high tension pole to get a bird's nest cannot recover for Injuries as it was the nest and not the pole which attracted him; and, as the nest was a
natural condition, the defendant had no reason to anticipate his presence.
21. RESTATEMNT, TORTS § 339, illustration 2 (1934).
22. Mendelowitz v. Neisner, 258 N. Y. 181, 186, 179 N. E. 378, 380 (1932). In this
case, the opinion, after quoting from the analogous section of the RESTATEENT, TORTS
§ 209 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1929), states: "This may be more liberal to the injured party
than the long line of decisions in this State. However, even within this rule, as stated
by the American Law Institute, we think the condition of the wall did not involve an
unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury which the owner should have realized."
23. Bergman v. Feitelowitz, 253 App. Div. 323, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 983 (2d Dep't 1938), rev'd,
278 N. Y. 620, 16 N. E. 2d 127 (1938).
24. 258 N. Y. 181, 179 N. E. 378 (1932).
25. Bergman v. Feitelowitz, 253 App. Div. 323, 1 N. Y. S. 2d 983 (2d Dep't 1938), rev'd,
278 N. Y. 620, 16 N. E. 2d 127 (1938), and Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 270
App. Div. 778, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 529 (3d Dep't 1946), rev'd, 296 N. Y. 154, 71 N. E. 2d
447 (1947).
26. Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Corp., 296 N. Y. 154, 71 N. E. 2d 447 (1947). The
court deciding the instant case found for the infant plaintiff and cited as its first authority
therefor § 339 of the Restatement of Torts. Justice Lawrence, dissenting in the Appellate Division report of the Carbone case, stated: "It seems to me that the claimed tendency to enlarge the field of liability which is suggested by the respondent In referring
to the Restatement of the Law of Torts has not been adopted by our courts." 270 App.
Div. 778, 780, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 529, 531 (3d Dep't 1946). The Court of Appeals reversed
and restated its traditional position, "Giving to the infant plaintiffs every favorable Inference which may be had from the evidence they were at most bare licensees. The duty
impressed by law upon the defendants in those circumstances has been repeatedly the subject of decision by this court . . . 'Toward mere trespassers or bare licensees the rule Is
well settled that the only duty owing to them by the owner or occupier of land Is to
abstain from inflicting intentional, wanton or wilful injuries unless he maintains some
hidden engine of destruction, such as spring guns or kindred devices, upon his property."'
296 N. Y. 154, 158, 159, 71 N. E. 2d 447, 448 (1947).

